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I. Introduetion
I
nternational eapital movements and trade flows mainly oeeur
between the relatively rieh nations of the world eeonomy. This
empirieal pattern is just the opposite ofwhat eould be expeeted
from a simple neoelassieal modeloftradeandgrowth. Withlabor and
eapital as the basie faetors of produetion, and an intemationally
available teehnology with eonstant returns to seale, sueh a model
implies thatinternationallydifferent pereapitaineomes orperworker
produetion levels must be due to internationally different levels of
(physieal) eapital per worker. With a higher marginal produet of
eapital in the relatively poor eountries, it follows that eapital should
flow from rieh to poorcountries. The model predicts thatthis process
will eontinue until the returns to the faetors of produetion will be
equalized. Hence, profits and wages are supposed to converge in the
long run.
The standard explanation why the expeeted capital flows and an
overall quasi-automatieconvergence ofpercapitaineomes arenotob-
served is the absence ofmarket economies and an appropriate insti-
tutional framework, and especially the absence of assured property
rights or the existenee ofpolitical risks in many developing eountries.
Apart from the empirical problem ofhow to measure the impact of
these factors, some doubts remain whether this argument provides a
suffieient explanation. First, even among developed market econo-
Remark: Paper presented at the 8th Annual Congress of the European Economic
Association, held in Helsinki, Finland, August 27-29, 1993. I thank Markus Diehl,
Ulrich Hiemenz, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the University of
Cologne for helpful comments, and Michaela Rank for able research assistance.Gundlach: Human Capital 351
mies with a comparableinstitutional framework and assured property
rights, the extent of real capital mobility is surprisingly low, as was
first shown by Feldstein and Horioka [1980]. Although their results
have been criticized for various reasons,l the core oftheir argument
is still valid: Since national saving and investment rates are highly
correlated, real capital is not as mobile between countries as observed
financial capital flows seem to suggest. Second, prior to 1945, much
oftheThirdWorld had been subject to legal andinstitutionalarrange-
ments imposed by the colonial powers for decades, and in some cases
even for more than a century. No major real capital flows in favor of
the colonies occurred, however, despite the obvious absence ofa polit-
ical risk. According to Davis and Huttenback [1989], the reason was
that rates of return on capital in, e.g., the British colonies did not
exceed European returns for similar investments. Hence the question
arises why rates ofreturn on capital can be equalized between coun-
tries with similar institutional frameworks in the face of substantial
differences in per capita incomes.
This paper discusses the hypothesis that part of the explanation
why the expected capital flows are not observed may be the existence
of external benefits of human capital [Lucas, 1988; 1990]. This hy-
pothesis can change the direction of the predicted capital flows, be-
cause it may imply that human capital and not physical capital is the
relatively scarce factor in developing countries. That is, the implicit
rate of return differentials may vanish ifinternational differences in
the stock ofhuman capital and possibly existing human capital exter-
nalities are properly accounted for.
Apart from the externality question it seems to be almost self-
evident thatinternationaldifferences in the stock ofhumancapital are
somehow positively related to the observed income differentials be-
tween the industrialized and the developing countries. Recent at-
tempts to incorporate human capital variables into the analysis of
cross-country growth equations have shown that the hypothesis of
long-run (conditional) convergence as derived from a constant re-
turns to scale growth model can not be ruled out[Barro, 1991; Levine
and Renett, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992]. However, it is rather doubtful
whether these results rule out the alternative hypothesis of external
benefits of human capital, since the speed of (conditional) conver-
gence seems to be rather slow: Itis estimated that the halfway time to
1 For arecent review, see Frankel [1992].352 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
reach a steady state after an exogenous shock is about 35 years.
2
Therefore, ifshocks occur frequently enough the concept ofcatching
up and convergence somehow loses its empirical relevance. Empirical
supportfor the hypothesis ofa ratherlimited potentialfor catchingup
in terms ofpercapita incomes comes from Quah [1993]. Allowing for
stochastically time-varying components in the underlying data gener-
ating process, he finds thatthe economies across the world seem to be
converging to a distribution where many remain wealthy, and many
remain poor, and middle-income countries seem to be a vanishing
class. This conclusion introduces the questionwhether economic poli-
cies with respect to human capital formation could change the speed
ofcatching up.
Up to now, the measurement ofhuman capital in a cross-country
context rests on rather cmde attempts to empirically identify this
theoretical variable.3 Mainly secondary school enrollment rates or
literacy rates have been used as proxies for the investment in human
capital or the stock ofhuman capital. Recently, several authors have
constructed somewhat improved estimates for the educational attain-
ment ofthe labor force in a cross-country context, which may serve
as a proxy for the stock ofhuman capital. In a background study for
the World Development Report 1991, Lau et al. [1991] provide panel
estimates based on cumulated primary and secondary school enroll-
mentrates andonassumptions aboutsurvival rates ofthepopulation.
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada [1992] additionally include higher-
level education but solely rely on census and survey data. Kyriacou
[1991] also constructed panel data by using recent school enrollment
rates to extrapolate previous Psacharopoulos-Arriagada data for the
1970s. At present, the most comprehensive approach is provided by
Barro and Lee [1993], who use a large number ofcensus and survey
data, across countries and over time, and interpolation techniques to
derive at a data set for the years ofcompleted schooling for persons
aged 25 and over, for 129 countries over five-year periods from 1960
to 1985. Still, all these measures ignore two important factors of
human capital accumulation: the experience of the workforce, and
2 This speed ofconvergence has been estimatedfrom various cross-section sources. For
international output movements, see Mankiw et al. [1992]; for regional output move-
ments across European economies, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991]; for regional
output movements across the United States, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992].
3 By contrast, see the pioneering work ofDenison [1962] for estimating the contribu-
tion of improved labor quality (human capital accumulation) to income growth in a
time-series context.Gundiaeh: Human Capital 353
international differences in the quality of formal education. There-
fore, it is tempting to conclude that all recent studies have used a
proxy for human capital which is more or less uncorrelated with the
"true" stock of human capital.
Without improved cross-country estimates ofthe stock ofhuman
capital it is rather difficult to evaluate the role ofhuman capital for-
mation for economic development, and even more so to evaluate the
externality argument with respect to human capital. Both questions
are rather crucial for economic policy considerations. For instance, if
such externalities exist, there may be large macroeconomic benefits of
economic policies promoting the education and training ofthe work-
force. And even ifsuch externalities do not exist, policies promoting
education and training ofthe workforce may have a more beneficial
impact on per capita incomes than policies enhancing the accumula-
tion ofphysical capital.
Appropriate human capital stock series might be constructed by
defining the human capital investmentmade during a year by the sum
ofthe social per capita costs ofeducation over all pupils and students
[Schultz, 1993]. Atleast for most developing countries, however, even
the necessary statistics on educational expenditures are not available;
and even ifthey were, the human capital accumulated by experience
would not be accounted fore Ina seminal paper, Krueger [1968] devel-
oped an indirect way to estimate the relative stock ofhuman capital
from census data for a cross section ofcountries. In the next sections,
I extend her approach and present estimates for the stock ofhuman
capital for selected countries relative to the United States in 1980.
Employing alternative neoclassical growth models, I use these esti-
mates to reconsider the predicted direction of international capital
flows.
11. A Conceptional Framework for Measuring the Stock
of Human Capital
Following closely the approach suggested by Krueger [1968,
pp. 642-645], Iassume that all countries have access to the same
technology. This common technology may be represented by an ag-
gregate constant returns to scale production function of the general
form:
(1)354 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
where Y is total income, and the X/s are the quantities ofthe factors
ofproduction; let X0 be the number ofpersons in the labor force. The
marginal products ofall factors are assumed to be positive and dimin-
ishing, and are denoted byf::
y = f~Xo +...+f: Xi +...+f~Xn. (2)
Using this framework, consider the case ofa resource-rich and resource-
poor country. With smailletters indicating per capita variables, let
(3)
describe the production function for the resource-poor country, and
let
y' = E f/' h~ + E f~' z~ i lh 1 j Jz J (4)
describe the production function for the resource-rich country, where
the h/s are quantities ofspecific elements ofthestock ofhumancapital,
and the z/s are the quantities ofall other production factors (both on
aper capita basis). Assume further that the rich country has more
resources ofevery factor on aper capita basis than the poor country,
and that only certain elements of the stock of human capital such as
age and education can be observed. In such a setting, it follows that
the maximum relative income the average personfrom a poorcountry
can achieve ifhe were working with otherwise identical factor endow-
ments of the rich country is given by
-p - ~ fl'hP/ ~ fl'h'
Ymax - ~ Jih i ~ Jih i'
1 1
(5)
where the human capital resources ofthe poor country are evaluated
with the marginal products ofthe rich country, which also reflect the
endowment with all other factors of production.
Given the above assumptions, this relative income is larger than
the actually observed income differential, because only different stocks
ofhumancapital are considered and all otherfactor deficiencies ofthe
resource-poor country are ignored. To see why this is so, first consider
the case that both countries have identical factor endowments. Thus
no income differential should exist. Second, assume that the poor and
the rich country have the same endowment ofevery factor except for
human capital, of which the poor country has less. Hence, the actual
income differential should reflect the different endowments with
human capital. Third, assume that the poor country has less ofevery
factor ofproduction, but only human capital endowments can be ob-Gundiaeh: Human Capital 355
served. Then (5) gives the maximum relative income attainable for the
average person from the poor country, because all other endowment
deficiencies of the poor country are ignored, although they mayaiso
contribute to the observed income differential.
Putdifferently, the use ofthemarginal products oftherich country
will understate the "true" difference in income resulting from the re-
source disparity, since these marginal products depend on the endow-
ment with all other factors of production which are assumed to be
more abundant in the rich country than in the poorcountry. Ifcertain
quantities ofspecific elements ofthe stock ofhumancapital are known
for both countries, the marginal product of this factor in the rich
country can be used to compute a lower-bound estimate ofthe result-
ing difference in per capita incomes. Furthermore, something can be
said about the relative importance offactor endowments for which no
information is available. Ifa fraction ofthe observed income differen-
tial between the poor and the rich country is known to be due to a
deficiency of a subset of m resources; then all other factors cannot
account for more than yr- yP- Ym' where Ym is the fraction of the in-
come differential due to the identified resource differences. This calcu-
lation, which was the main issue addressed by Krueger [1968], may
shed some light on the quantitative importance of different bottle-
necks for economic development.
The estimates derived from (5) can be used to compute the stock
of human capital in a poor country relative to a rich country, which
is the main issue ofthis paper. Suppose that bothcountries are subject





where h represents the stock ofhuman capital (labor), z represents all
other resources and is assumed to be identical across countries, and r:x
and ßare the distributional shares of the inputs.
It follows that the relative per capita income is given by
Y~ax = yp/yr = hP• (8)
If it is possible empirically to construct an index number from (5)
which, given (8), has the dimension of the human capital stock raised
to the power oflabor's share, the relative stock ofhumancapitalin the
poor country is given by:
h= e(lnyf!nax)/P • (9)356 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
The inverse of (9) gives the labor efficiency equivalent of an average
worker from the rich country, with the dimension: number ofaverage
workers from the poor country per average worker from the rich
country. That is, this figure gives the number ofaverage workers from
the poorcountryequivalent to the productivity ofone average worker
from the rich country, given that all workers are equipped with iden-
tical factor endowments except for human capital.
111. Estimating the Relative Stock ofHuman Capital
Estimating the relative stock ofhuman capital by (9) requires the
identification of resource endowments which are related to the theo-
retical concept ofhuman capital, and the measurement ofthe respec-
tive marginal products in the country of reference. Following the
seminal work ofBecker [1964] and Mincer [1974], the major determi-
nants ofindividual human capital accumulation are the years offor-
mal schooling received, and the experience gained by leaming on the
job, typically measured by age. These factors have been found to ex-
plain a largefraction ofobservedincome differentials between individ-
uals.
Therefore, the analysis starts with a cross classification ofthe pop-
ulation by years of schooling completed and age, which is available
from aggregated United States Census datafor 1980 [US Department
ofCommerce, 1984]. Average United States incomes, disaggregated by
years of formal schooling completed and by specific age groups, are
used as the marginal productsf: of the reference country (equation
(5)). Choosing the United States to be the reference country is easily
justified with respect to per capita income differentials, at least for the
year 1980. The implication for the present analysis is that the United
Statesis assumed to have moreresources ofevery factor ofproduction
on aper capita basis than any other country in the sample.4
Otherfactors thatmight influence the measuredefficiency ofa unit
oflabor, especially when comparing the stock ofhuman capital in the
United States with the one in developing countries, are the degree of
urbanization and the labor force participation rate of women. Since
4 This assumption may be regarded as unreasonable with respect to unskilled and
semi-skilled labor. However, on average a high-skilled worker can always do the work
ofa low-skilled worker. Hence, countries with more human capital perworker have as
much unskilled labor as, and more skilIed labor per capita than, countries with less
human capital [Krueger, 1968].Gundiaeh: Human Capital 357
average urban incomes are higher than rural incomes, and average
female incomes are lower than male incomes, human capital endow-
ments of developing countries estimated by the framework of the
previous section will be biased upward in the case ofless urbanization
than in the reference country, and biased downward in the case of a
lower female labor force participation. Therefore, I further extend the
cross classification, namely by sex and place of residence.5
The most recent aggregated census data for a cross section of
countries which allow for a cross classification by years of schooling,
age, sex, and place ofresidence are available from the United Nations
(UN) Demographic Yearbook [1985; 1990]. The list of countries for
which this cross classification is possible is rather short, even if less
important statistical problems are ignored. Countries included are:
Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Ecuador, Honduras, Japan,
New Zealand, Panama, and Sri Lanka. To match these data with the
United States Census data, two major difficulties have to be consid-
ered.
First, the aggregated US dataexclude all individuals younger than
18 years, whereas the UNdataexclude all individuals younger than 15
years. Inthe computations below, I compare the US age cohort 18-24
to the age cohort 15-24 for the other countries in the sampIe. Since
this age cohort accounts for a larger fraction of the population in
developing countries, multiplication with the lower than average US
marginal products will end up in a downward biased estimate oftheir
relative human capital endowment.
Second, for most countries the UN data do not provide informa-
tion on the years of schooling completed, but only on the level of
schooling received. Here the main problem arises from differences in
the average years ofschooling by level: According to the UNdata,first
and secondary level each consist ofsix years ofschooling, while in the
United States the elementary (first) level consists of eight years, and
high school (secondary level) consists offour years. To best match the
UN classification with the published US Census classification, I com-
pare 0-7years ofschoolingin the United States tofirst level schooling
in the othercountries ofthe sampIe. This procedure maycause a small
upward bias in the estimation of the relative human capital endow-
ments, because the marginal product used is possibly higher than the
5 The data for urban residence are not published in US Department of Commerce
[1984] but can be computed as the weighted difference ofthe entries for "Total" and
"Rural".358 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
true marginal product for 0-6 years of formal schooling. A more
severe upward bias may be introduced as drop-out rates can be ex-
pected to be much higher in developing countries than in the US.
These effects are not controlled for in the UN data, Le., the average
person from a poor country reported to have been to primary educa-
tionina census actuallymayhave received less thansix years offormal
education.
Table 1 presents the incomes (marginal products) assigned to indi-
vidual classes onthe basis ofUS Census data, aggregated tomatch the
structure ofthe UNdata. The marginal products for the United States
(I;) are derived by summing over individual census classes:
(10)
where ~j is the number ofpersons with income in ith subclass ofj in
the United States distribution, J;j is mean weakly earnings of those
persons with income in the subclass, and I:j is the total number of
persons in the subclass. Multiplication of the I; s with the respective
fractions ofthe population, and summing up over thej subclasses, gives
a human capital index number for the reference country. The human
capital index for the country ofcomparison is derived in the same way
by using its own populationdistribution (see (5)). Then, the estimation
oftherelative stock ofhumancapital follows from (6) using additional
information for the labor share (ß) of the country ofcomparison.
By this computation, those persons with no earnings are assigned
mean weakly earnings ofzero. This is equivalent to allowing for sub-
class-specific labor force participation rates. Hence, it is assumed that
United States' subclass-specific labor force participation rates resem-
ble the labor force participation rates in the other countries of the
sampie. Compared to the difficulties that arise in matching the differ-
ent distributions with respect to age cohorts and level of schooling,
this assumption introduces more severe problems.
Since experience gained by learning on thejob is one ofthe major
determinants ofhuman capital accumulation, internationally different
labor force participation or unemployment rates will create biased
estimates of human capital endowments in the present context, be-
cause countries with lower labor force participation rates and higher
unemployment rates have to face higher depreciation rates of their
stock of human capital. If the marginal products derived for the
United States labor market experience are applied to a country with
weaker labor market conditions, its estimated relative human capitalGundiaeh: Human Capital 359
Table 1 - Mean Weekly Earnings in 1979 by Age and Education







18-24 112 159 174
25-34 173 271 343
35-44 213 340 529
45-54 222 348 585
55-64 173 288 518
65+ 34 72 204
2. Urbanfemales
18-24 57 99 128
25-34 68 120 191
35-44 73 122 196
45-54 66 115 195
55-64 47 88 162
65+ 8 18 41
3. Rural males
18-24 103 167 187
25-34 162 278 337
35-44 203 335 477
45-54 201 326 508
55-64 152 256 421
65+ 43 80 159
4. Ruralfemales
18-24 43 87 121
25-34 54 95 157
35-44 56 101 163
45-54 53 93 167
55-64 37 67 131
65+ 11 20 44
8 First level=0- 7 years ofschooling; second level=8-12 years ofschooling; third
level=12+ years ofschooling.
Source: US Department of Commerce [1984, Table 295, pp. 447-450 and pp. 471-
474].
endowment will be biased upward. Therefore, the present framework
will produce reasonable results only if it is applied to countries with
roughly comparable labor market experiences. In the absence of reli-
able labormarket statistics for most ofthe developing countries in the
sampIe, I use the growth rate of per capita income to proxy different360 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
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8 Computed from Summers and Heston [1991, column 2; (InRGDPCHtj
InRDGPCHo)jt]. - b Computed from UNESCO [1988, Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.7 and 4.1]
and Summers and Heston [1991, columns 13 and 17] according to (Expjpup)·ppp,
where Expjpup: total expenditure per pupil; P: price level ofGDP; ExR: exchange
rate; PPP: purchasing power parity (GDP)=P·ExR. - C 1959-1980. - d 1960-
1980.
depreciation rates ofthestock ofhumancapital thereby assuming that
faster economic growth goes hand in hand with more favorable labor
market conditions. With the US rate as a point ofreference, the least
comparable countries seem to be Bangladesh and Sri Lanka(Table 2).
By the same token, the years offormal schooling received will only
represent a comparable fraction ofthe human capital accumulated if
the quality of schooling does not differ internationally. Up to now,
there is only very limited empirical evidence on international differ-
ences in the quality offormal schooling.6 Here, I use total public ex-
penditures per pupil in 1980 as an extremely broad indicator of the
quality of education. These data are available from the UNESCO
Yearbook [1988]. To make them comparable internationally, expendi-
tures are converted to international US $ by use ofPurchasing Power
6 Foran analysis ofthe relative efficiency ofprivate and public schools for selected de-
veloping countries, see Jimenez et al. [1991]; for an analysis ofthe consequences ofdif-
ferent education policy regimes in Tanzania and Kenya, see Knight and Sabot [1990];
for a comparison ofAsian and US schools based on achievement tests, see Stevenson
[1992].Gundiaeh: Human Capital 361
Parities provided by Summers and Heston [1991]. Again, Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka are among the seemingly least comparable countries,
but the large variation in cross-country expenditures per pupil should
be also kept in mind for all other developing countries included in the
sampIe.7 Given that the estimates for the growth rate ofper capita in-
come and the expenditures per pupil in Table 2 are reasonable proxies
for the depreciation rate ofthe stock ofhuman capital and the quality
ofschooling, the countries most likely to offer comparable estimates
for the stock of human capital are Cameroon, Canada, Brazil, Ecua-
dor, Japan, and Panama. Estimates for the othercountries will also be
presented, but are considered to be less reliable.
Apart from international differences in the quality of education
and in the rate of depreciation of human capital, the estimates may
also be biased because of the level ofaggregation used. For instance,
ifthefraction ofthose who actually completefirst, second, orthirdlevel
education differs internationally, human capital index numbers based
on aggregated census data are not comparable as was argued above.
This information is not available from the UN [1985; 1990] data for
most of the countries in the sampIe; and from US Department of
Commerce [1984], the highest disaggregation available by years of
schooling completed is for eight subgroups which reflect the organiza-
tion ofthe US educational system: 0-7 years and 8 years for the first
level (elementary); 1-3 years and 4 years for the second level (high
school);1-3years, 4years, 5- 6years, and 7ormore years for the third
level (college).
The robustness of the human capital estimate with respect to the
level ofaggregation is checked for the case ofPanamaby using micro-
data from the Socioeconomic Survey of1983 [Republica de Panama,
1983] 8 which includes information on the years of schooling com-
pleted. Since the distribution ofthe population generally changes very
slowly, the discrepancy between the 1980 census data and the 1983
survey data can be neglected. The procedure used to calculate the
alternative human capital index for Panama is the same as outlined
above, the only difference being the level of aggregation of the years
7 Psacharopoulos [1984] reports that public expenditures per pupil dramatically de-
clined in developing countries between 1960 and 1975. He notes that according to un-
publishedestimates, the averageOECDcountryinvested fifty times moreperpupil than
did any low-income country in 1977, which is roughly in line with the estimates in
Table 2; in 1960, this ratio stood at 16:1.
8 A detailed description ofthe Socioeconomic Survey ofPanama (SESP) conducted in
1983 is given in Sahota [1990].Table 3 - Relative Per Capita Incomes and Relative Human Capital Stocks, 1980
Relative Maximum Percentage income Labor Relative stock Labor efficiency
per capita attainable relative differential explained share ofhuman equivalent per
income
8 per capita by different human capital average person
(percent) income
8 capital endowments per person 8 from the
(percent) (percent) (percent) United States
(1) b (2)C (3)d (4)e (5)f (6)8
Bangladesh 4.4 56.8 45.2 n.a. h 15.2 6.6
Brazil 29.7 61.5 55.0 n.a. i 37.8 2.6
Cameroon 10.1 55.4 49.6 0.36 19.4 5.2
Canada 92.9 94.0 85.7 0.69 91.4 1.1
Ecuador 21.7 60.5 50.6 0.39 27.6 3.6
Honduras 9.7 55.4 49.4 n.a.
j 22.8 4.4
Japan 63.8 88.3 32.5 0.64 82.3 1.2
New Zealand 61.0 97.7 5.9 0.70 96.7 1.0
Panama 23.3 71.1 37.5 0.56 54.4 1.9
Panama (SESP) - 73.9 33.9 - 58.3 1.7
Sri Lanka 10.8 61.2 43.5 0.59 43.5 2.3
8 USA=100. - b Summers and Heston [1991, column 8; y]. - CComputed according to (Lf/,xf/Lf/'XU·1oo. Sources are United
Nations [1985, Table 38 (xP)]; United Nations [1990, Table 34 (xP)]; Republica de Panama [1983] for PanamaSESP (xP); US Department
ofCommerce [1984, Table 296, pp. 447-450and pp. 471-474] for x', f". Dates ofCensus are: Bangladesh 1981, Brazil1980, Cameroon
1976, Canada 1986, Ecuador 1974, Honduras 1983, Japan 1980, New Zealand 1981, Panama 1980, Sri Lanka 1981. - dComputed from
columns (1) and (2) according to [100-(2)]/[100-(1)],100. - eComputed according to ß= W/(GDP-T-D+S) where ß: labor share,
GDP: gross domestic product, W: compensation ofemployees, T: indirect taxes, S: subsidies, D: depreciation (approximated to be 10 per-
cent). Source is United Nations [1989, Table 6]. - f Computed from columns (2) and (4) according to eln[(2)/100l/(4). - 8Computed from
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ofschooling. Here, I try to match the structure provided by the eight
subgroups available for the United States. Thatis, ifthere are substan-
tial differences ofthe population distributions within first, second, and
third level education, then the two human capital stock estimates for
Panama should differ.
Table 3 presents the results ofthe computations ofthe two central
equations of the previous section: an estimate for the maximum in-
come that an average person from a specific country could attain if
he were working with United States factor endowments other than
human capital (column (2), based on equation (5)); and, based on this
finding, an estimate for the relative stock of human capital for a
cross-section of countries (column (5), based on equation (9)). These
results indicate that a substantial fraction of the observed per capita
income differentials relative to the Untied States can be accounted for
bydifferences in humancapitalendowments, thus replicating the basic
finding in Krueger [1968]. The second entry for Panama shows that
the estimates (for Panama) are largely uneffected by the level ofaggre-
gation of years of formal schooling received. The finding points to
roughly similar cross-country population distributions within levels of
education, at least in the case of the United States and Panama.
To be more specific, the results in Table 3 can be read as folIows.
In 1980, the income of the average Brazilian stood at roughly 30
percent of the income of the average person from the United States
(column (1)). Ifthe average Brazilian were working with United States
factor endowments, he would double bis income, reaching approxi-
mately 60 percent of the American level. Hence, his human capital
endowment would not suffice to reach the average United States
income level even if there were no other endowment deficiencies in-
volved, which is why column (2) provides the maximumincome attain-
able. Putdifferently, more thanhalfoftheobserved income differential
between the United States and Brazil is due to the lower Brazilian
stock of human capital (column (3)), leaving less than half of the ob-
served income differential to be due to other (unidentified) Brazilian
resource deficiencies.
For Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, Honduras, and Sri Lanka
the explanatory power ofdifferent human capital endowments for ob-
served income differentials is of the same order of magnitude. In the
case ofCanada, almost all ofthe observed income differentials can be
explained in terms ofdifferent humancapital endowments. This result
points to relatively identical overall factor endowments for Canada
and the United States: if two countries exhibit the same set of factor364 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
endowments except for human capital, the observed income differ-
ential should reflect the different human capital endowments. Con-
trary to these cases, the empirical evidence for Japan, Panama, and
New Zealand suggests that different human capital endowments are
less important for an explanation ofthe observed income differentials
than other unidentified factor endowment deficiencies. Put differently,
these countries seem to display relatively low per capita incomes de-
spite a well-trained laborforce. Such a finding may indicate the poten-
tial for fast future income growth, since it points to an unexploited
resource endowment. Of course, this is not to say that unexploited
resource endowments are a sufficient conditionfor prospective income
growth, as both New Zealand and Panama prove.
The estimates for the relative stock of human capital resemble
these considerations (column (5), based on equation (9)). Forinstance,
the average person from Cameroon or Bangladesh has less than
20 percent of the human capital of the average American; average
persons from Brazil have twice as much human capital as the former;
and average persons from other OECD countries have almost as
much human capital as the average American. Turning to labor effi-
ciency equivalents (column (6)), these results reveal that international
productivity assessments based on per capita (or per worker) incomes
may lead to unduly pessimistic conclusions. While per capita income
differentials imply that the average American is, say, as productive as
10 Cameroonians or4Panamanians (column (1)), the consideration of
different humancapitalendowments reduces suchestimates to afactor
of 5 in the case of Cameroon and to a factor of 2 in the case of
Panama.
Table 4compares the estimates for the stock ofhumancapital with
recently published estimates based on alternative approaches. The
estimates derived in this paper substantially differ from the estimates
presented by Kyriacou [1991] and Lau et al. [1991], both with respect
to level and variance across countries. They are more similar to the
estimates presented by Barro and Lee [1993] and Psacharopoulos and
Arriagada [1992]. Some striking differences remain, however. This
papercomes up with a much lower estimate for Ecuador, and a higher
estimate for Japan; in the case of Brazil, the estimate is between the
estimates of the other two approaches.
Taken together, the large variation of the cross-section estimates
for the relative stock ofhumancapitalmaypointto a high explanatory
power of this concept with respect to different per capita incomes.
Needless to say that all the estimates should be interpreted very care-Gundlach: Human Capital
Table 4 - Comparing Alternative Proxies for the Stock
ofHuman Capital, ca. 1980
a
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Barro, Lee Kyriacou Lau et al. Psacharopoulos, This
[1993] b [1991]c [1991] d Arriagada paper
f
[1992]e
Bangladesh 14.3 26.3 37.4 19.0 15.2
Brazil 25.1 45.5 32.4 44.4 37.8
Cameroon 15.1 40.0 29.8 17.5 19.4
Canada 85.4 79.9 n.a. 92.9 91.4
Ecuador 45.4 57.5 n.a. 51.6 27.6
Honduras 22.7 38.2 n.a. 27.8 22.8
Japan 68.9 74.0 76.0 77.8 82.3
New Zealand 104.5 73.1 n.a. 92.3 96.7
Panama 50.3 57.9 55.2 52.4 54.4
Sri Lanka 43.6 48.9 71.1 59.5 43.5
Note: Coefficient
ofvariation 0.64 0.32 0.40 0.52 0.63
apercent; USA=100. - b Years of completed schooling for persons aged 25 and
over. - C Estimated years ofschoolinginthe laborforce. - d Estimated average years
of education of the population of working age group (15 to 64); the data are
available from the World Bank on request; assumed absolute figure for the US:
12.2 years. - eMean years ofschooling embodied in the labor force. - f See Table 3.
fully, since they may suffer from a number ofmeasurement and com-
parability problems some ofwhich were outlined above. Compared to
the presently available proxies for the stock ofhuman capital referred
to in Table 4, however, the estimates presented in this paper provide
more comprehensive information. Most importantly, they include a
measure ofhuman capital accumulated by experience (proxied by the
age structure of the population), and they additionally include third
level education as well as adjustments for cross-country differences in
the degree ofurbanization and gender-specific age-education distribu-
tions.
IV. The Stock of Human Capital and International Capital Flows
Large differences in per capita incomes across the world can be
interpreted as indicating a high marginal productivity of physical
capitalinpoorcountries, implicitly predicting large international cap-
italflows. Actually, this does nothappen. The relative stocks ofhuman
capital estimated in this paper can be used to give an explanation of
this puzzle in terms of a quantitative assessment.366 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
Following Lucas [1990] 9, I reproduce the performance of three
simple neoclassical models in predicting the direction ofinternational
capital flows between the United States, as the country of reference,
and the stylized economies of "South Asia", "Latin America", and
"Other OECD" which consist ofthe population weighted averages of
Bangladesh and Sri Lan-ka; Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, and Panama;
and Canada, Japan, and New Zealand, respectively. Acknowledging
the numerous difficulties involved in the estimation procedure out-
lined in the previous section, it is nonetheless hoped that these broad
averages may serve as proxies for interregional differences in the stock
of human capital which allow an assessment of predictions derived
from alternative growth models.
Consider a Cobb-Douglas constant returns technology with a
common intercept and assume that this technology is available for all
countries:
(11)
where Y is total income, K is physical capital, and L is labor. Per
capita income is given by:
(12)
where y and kare income and physical capital, both per capita. The
marginal product of capital (r) is given by:
r=oy/ok=Arxka- 1 • (13)
Using the inverse ofthe productionfunction, the marginal product of
capital in terms of per capita income is given by:
r = Al/a rx y(a-1)/a • (14)
Hence, for average capital shares (a), and y measured relative to the
United States, equation (14) implies that the rate of return to capital
in any countryis y(a-1)/ä times higher thanin the United States. Hence,
this model predicts that the rate ofreturn to capital in South Asia is
89 times, in Latin America 6 times, and in other OECD more than
2 times higher than in the United States (Table 5, Model 1).10
9 Lucas [1990] found that external benefits ofhuman capital could account for a near
equivalence of the rates of return to physical capital between the United States and
India, thereby explaining the apparent lack of net international capital flows to the
latter.
10 Applying these calculations to the data for Canada from Table 3 produces a factor
of 1, Le., factor price equalization between Canada and the USoGundiaeh: Human Capital
Table 5 - Predicted Rate ofReturn Differentials Relative
to the United States (Factor ofproportionality) a
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Relative Relative Average Rate ofreturn in ... is ... times
per capita percapita profit higher than in the United States
income
b stock of share




c 0.05 0.20 0.4 89.4 8 1.6 0.005
Latin America d 0.30 0.40 0.4 6.1 1.5 0.6 0.06
Other OECD
e 0.70 0.85 0.3 2.3 1.6 1.3 0.75
a All columns (computed) from Table 3. (Xi=1-Pi; (Xus=0.25; (i~! L(Xi+!(XUS. Model 1:
l«-l)/«-; model 2: (y/h)(«--l)/<<-; model 3: (y/h)(«--l)/«-h"l/<<~ - b Approximatedipopulation weighted
averages. - C Bangladesh, Sri Lanka.- d Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras~ Panama.- e Canada,Japan,
New Zealand.
An apparent reason why these large rate ofreturn differentials are
exaggerated is the use of the per capita concept, which assumes per-
sons in the United States and elsewhere as having the same productiv-
ity. Considering international differences in the stock ofhuman capi-
tal, the production function reads:
(15)
where h is the stock ofhuman capital per person. Income per effective
person (Ye) is given by:
Ye=Ak: with Ye= Y/hL and ke=K/hL. (16)
Similar to (14), the marginal product ofcapital in terms ofincome per
effective person is given by:
r = Al/a ~(y/h)(a-1)/a . (17)
Following this model, the previously estimated rate ofreturn differen-
tials (from (14)) are sharply reduced (Table 5, Model 2). Rate ofreturn
differentials in the range of 50 percent with respect to Latin America
may not be high enough to offset the risks of investing there, but
should provide a strong motive to transfer capital from the US to
other OECD countries. The largest differential remains in the case of
South Asia: Ifthe rate ofreturn to capital in stylized South Asia really
were 700 percent higher than in the United States as predicted by this
model, one would expect to see a large amount ofcapital flowing from
the US to this region. Instead, labor seems to flow at maximum
allowable rates to the United States notonlyfrom SouthAsia, butalso368 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
from Latin America. Ifthere is a strongmotive for labor toflow in one
direction, however, there should be an equally strong motive for cap-
ital to flow in the opposite direction. Why this does not happen can
be explained by a model which includes an internal as weIl as an
external effect related to the stock of human capital [Lucas, 1988]. In
this model, the production function for income per effective person is
given by:
Ye = Ak:hY • (18)
The term hY can be interpreted as an external effect which multiplies
the productivity ofa worker at any skililevel. Hence (18) says that an
increase in the average stock of human capital by 1 percent will
increase the human capital of an individual working in this environ-
ment by y percent. The implication is that this model can account for
different cross-country incomes per efIective person, even if the rates
of return to physical capital are equalized, and the technology is
generally available. In the previous models, rates of return to capital
could not equalize as long as per capita incomes difIered. Here, the
remaining spread may just be offset or even turned around by the
human capital externality. The corresponding equation for the mar-
ginal product of capital clarifies this interpretation:
r = Al/a <xy~a-l)/a hY/a. . (19)
This model requires an empirical estimate for y. Lucas [1988, p.22]
shows how to derive such an estimate. First rewrite (18) in terms of
per capita income:
Y = A ka. h(l-a.) hY.
Then, the marginal product of capital equation reads:
r = A<xk(a.-l) h(l-a) hY.
(20)
(21)
With the Cobb-Douglas technology used here, the marginal product
of capital equals the profit share times the average product. Writing
(21) in logs (In) and using r=<x(y/k) gives the steady state solution of
the model for a common growth rate of per capita income (ln y) and
per capita capital (ln k) as:
lny= [(1- <X+y)/(1-(X)] In h . (22)
At least for the United States, itis possible to estimate y, given thatthe
average annual growth rate ofthestock ofhumancapital (lnh) can be
proxied by anestimate based onthe growth offormal schooling alone.Gundlach: Human Capital 369
Lucas [1988; 1990] computed a value for y of approximately 0.4
using estimates for In Yus =0.014, rxus=0.25, and In hus=0.009 from
Denison [1962] for the period 1909-1957. Here, I compute an alterna-
tive estimate for y ofapproximately 1.4 which is based onestimates for
Inyus=0.017 derived from Maddison [1991] for the periods 1820-
1989 and 1820-1973, and on estimates for In hus = 0.006 derived from
Denison [1974; 1985] for the periods 1929-1969, 1947-1969, and
1929-1982, with rxus=0.25 as before. Somewhat unrealistically, this
estimate for y implies that a doubling of all inputs would increase
output by a factor offive. However, the results for y are very sensitive
with respect to the proxy for In hand should only be taken as a range
ofpossible outcomes. Notwithstanding, some conclusions with respect
to rate ofreturn differentials and the direction ofinternational capital
flows can be drawn.
Going back to (19), the rate of return differentials further decline
if an externality (y =0.4) is introduced. By and large, the results could
be interpreted as representing rate ofreturn equalization; the result for
Latin America points to a somewhat lower rate of return than in the
United States (Table 5, modeI3). By giving a stronger weight to the
human capital externality, the results become more diverse. Broadly
speaking, for the extreme case of y= 1.4, the estimates are not too far
away from rate ofreturn'equalization in the case ofother OECD, but
reveal rate ofreturn differentials in favor ofthe United States by a fac-
tor of 200 in the case of South Asia and by a factor of 17 in the case
of Latin America. Hence, one should not expect any investment in
physical capital occurring in these regions. Actually, these regions not
only experienced positive investment rates, but also attracted some
capital inflows,ll at least until the early eighthies. Therefore, obvi-
ously, an estimate for y closer to 0.4 than to 1.4 seems to be more
reasonable.
These back-of-the-envelope calculations reveal that accountingfor
human capital externalities may change the predicted direction of
international capital flows, contrary to what may be indicated by per
capita income differentials alone. The empirical plausibility of a hu-
man capital externality can be assessed by (22). The externality dis-
appears (y = O) if the growth rate of per capita income equals the
growth rate of the per capita stock of human capital. Put differently,
with relatively weIl documented estimatesfor the long-run growth rate
11 Compare Summers and Heston [1991, columns 3,4 and 5]: [100-c-i-g] gives a nega-
tive current account balance (percent ofGDP), which indicates net capital inflows.370 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
ofthe United States per capitaincome (lnyus~ 1.7) and for the capital
share «(Xus~O.25), the Denison [1962; 1974; 1985] estimates for the
long-run growth rate ofthe stock ofhuman capital would have to be
corrected by a factor of 2 or 3 to eliminate the externality effect.
Although the presented empirical evidence does not suffice to
derive a conclusive point estimate ofthe human capital externality, it
is somewhat difficult to deny its existence in the context ofthe under-
lying production function approach. The implication ofthis hypothe-
sis is that the incentive for capital to flow to relatively poor countries
is probably even much lower than indicated by human capital ad-
justed income differentials. As a consequence, the catching-up poten-
tial of relatively poor countries may be severely restricted by their
ability to raise their stock of human capital. This interpretation, if
supported by further empirical evidence, may lead to a reconsider-
ation ofthe relative importance ofdevelopment policies encouraging
the accumulation of human capital.
~ Conclusions
Despite the unequaldistribution ofincomesintheworldeconomy,
relatively little capital is flowing to poor countries. A fair description
oftendencies prevailing since World War 11 seems to be thatthe world
economyis converging to a distribution ofincomeswheremanycoun-
tries remain wealthy, and many remain poor [Quah, 1993]. One way
to explain this empirical pattern is to stress "political risk" as the de-
cisive factor limiting international capital flows to poor countries.
Following this interpretation, international factor (for that matter,
capital) mobility could induce a catching up of the have-nots, and
finally a convergence ofpercapitaincomes, ifonly political risks were
eliminated.
Recently, advances in growth theory have led to endogenous
growthmodels thatare capable ofexplainingpersistent income differ-
entials. The crucial feature of these models is adeparture from the
usual assumption ofdiminishing returns to the factors ofproduction.
As was first shown by Romer [1986], a competitive dynamic equilib-
rium can exist ifoverall increasing returns to scale are external to the
firm. For the empirical analysis, the question remains where to look
for an externality. While many models can replicate the empirical
patterns, the Lucas [1988] model ofa human capital externality pro-
vides a promising starting point, because itincludes variables thatcanGundiaeh: Human Capital 371
be measured, at least in principle. Employing this model first of all
requires cross-country information on the stock ofhuman capital.
The estimates for the relative stock ofhuman capital presented in
Section 111 provide a first step in this direction. They are limited to a
rather small sampIe ofcountries, and certainly suffer from a number
of shortconiings which call for further research. Still, they are more
comprehensive than other presently available estimates for the stock
ofhuman capital. Their empirical plausibility can be assessed within
a productionfunction framework. The results suggest thataccounting
for the stock ofhuman capital somewhat reduces the implicit rate of
return differentials based on different per capita incomes, thereby
partlyexplaining why relatively little capital flows to poorcountries.
In the presence ofpolitical risk, remaining rate ofreturn differen-
tials in favor ofpoorcountries may not suffice to encourage substan-
tial capital flows. This interpretationis compatible with the empirical
facts, as weIl as an alternative interpretation, focussing on human
capital externalities. Referring to independent empirical evidence for
the United States, the existence of human capital extemalities does
not seem to be completely implausible. Given the estimates for the
relative stockofhumancapitalfor the sampIe ofcountries used in this
paper, accounting for human capital externalities reveals that rates of
return to physical capitalmay be substantially higher in rich countries
than in poor countries.
Without improved empirical evidence, it seems to be rather diffi-
cult to discriminate between the externality hypothesis and the polit-
ical risk hypothesis. Bothhypotheses may be relevant for an explana-
tion ofreal-world phenomena. But ifthe rates ofreturn to capital are
actually higher in rich countries, net capital flows to poor countries
will be fully offset by a reduction ofdomestic investment. Therefore,
external and internal development policies should mainly focus on
human capital accumulation, on investing in people rather than in-
vesting in physical capital. Obviously, this strategy will fail to induce
a catching up ofpoorcountries, ifpolitical risk is the decisive limiting
factor ofeconomic development. Still, even eliminating political risks
will not suffice to induce a catching up as long as large cross-country
differences in stocks ofhuman capital exist in the presence ofhuman
capital externalities.372 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
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***
A b st r a ct: Accounting for the Stock ofHuman Capital: Selected Evidence and
Potential Implications. - Given the observed distribution of output and labor across
countries, most capital flows should be from rich to poor countries. As is shown for a
limited sampie ofcountries, accounting for differences in the stock of human capital374 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
substantially reduces the implicit cross-country rate ofreturn differentials. Addition-
ally, accounting for human capital extemalities based on independent empirical evi-
dence, turns around the predicted rate ofreturn differentials in favor ofrich countries.
Hence, the world economy may converge to a rather unequal distribution ofincomes
as long as human capital accumulation is neglected as the key variable limiting eco-
nomic development. JEL No. F21, J24
*
Zusammenfassung: Berücksichtigung des Humankapitalbestandes: Einige
ausgewählte Befunde und mögliche Implikationen. - Angesichts der beobachteten Ver-
teilung von Produktion und Arbeit zwischen den Ländern müßten die meisten Kapital-
ströme von den reichen zu den armen Ländern fließen. Der Autor zeigt für eine be-
grenzte Auswahl von Ländern, daß sich die impliziten Ertragsdifferenzen zwischen
ihnen erheblich verringern, wenn Unterschiede im Humankapitalbestand berücksich-
tigt werden. Außerdem führt die Berücksichtigung der aufunabhängigen empirischen
Studien beruhenden Externalitäten des Humankapitalsdazu, daß sich die vorhergesag-
ten Ertragsdifferenzen zugunsten der reichen Länderumkehren. Demgemäß kann es in
der Weltwirtschaft zu einer ziemlich ungleichen Einkommensverteilung kommen, so-
lange die Akkumulationvon Humankapitalals Schlüsselvariable für die wirtschaftliche
Entwicklung vernachlässigt wird.